Abstract. An important cloud federation enabler is the development of suitable business models, which has so far received relatively little attention from investigators. Few efforts have been dedicated to investigation of business models for enabling cloud federations, especially with regard to distribution issues, in which centralized solutions are usually preferred. Hence, in our work we focus on the use of fully decentralized mechanisms supporting federation of private clouds based on barter mechanisms. We analyze the adaptation of fully decentralized incentive mechanisms previously used in the context of P2P desktop grids, and show that they are not suitable for federated cloud systems because fairness cannot always be guaranteed. We show initial results concerning the use of a mechanism intended to guarantee a higher level of fairness and thereby to promote voluntary participation in a decentralized federation without any central or trusted enforcing authority.
Introduction
Organizations with variable and peaky demand patterns often turn to public clouds (cf. "cloud bursting" [4] ) in order to meet unexpected or short-term needs. However, during off-peak times resources might become idle, which constitutes an efficiency loss for the organization. An alternative for cloud providers is to participate in a federation for exchanging idle resources. In particular private cloud providers, due to the usually limited amount of owned resources, would greatly benefit from this [2] .
From the architectural perspective, cloud federations can be either centralized or Peer-to-Peer (P2P) [3] . In centralized architectures, resource allocation is typically performed by a trusted central entity that is able to prevent free riding and to perform the best matching of consumers and providers. In P2P federations, on the other hand, participants must communicate and negotiate directly with each other. The advantages of decentralized topologies include extensibility, deployment, management, use and growth. The drawbacks, however, include difficulties in discovery, routing, security, and the fact that participants are mostly unknown to each other and cannot be assumed to be trustworthy or collaborative. Moreover, peers should be assumed to be selfish and to have an economic incentive to become free riders.
Similarly, from a market perspective cloud federations can be also classified as centralized or decentralized. In a centralized market system, bids and requests are collected by a central entity or market auctioneer that matches them and decide the best matching of buyers and sellers. In decentralized markets, on the other hand, buyers and sellers must explore the market by themselves and bargain directly with each other. Participants may provide resources in exchange for payment or by bartering. Payment schemes would require the introduction of complex management mechanisms and procedures, whereas bartering schemes can be implemented e.g. in the shape of flexible credit and debit local annotations. The latter would be very suitable for the federation of private clouds, since it is a wholly money-less and distributed scheme that can do without any trusted centralized entities. Obviously, there is a close relation between the architecture and the market structures of private cloud federations. In this work, we propose a lightweight P2P cloud federation infrastructure implementing a decentralized market system.
An important challenge concerns the promotion of cooperation among rational selfish individuals in a decentralized context with no central and trusted enforcing authority. In this kind of system, participants are usually left to themselves and only with limited information about the actual behavior or intention of other actors, may not keep promises, and must rely solely on their own experience, acquired through interactions with each other, in order to decide to what extent they should trust other partners. It is therefore natural to expect that, at first hand, participants will prefer to act as free riders. Moreover, collaborative partners may defect from the federation if they are not satisfied with the results of participation. Some form of individual incentives must therefore be enforced in order to ensure sustained voluntary participation. Our aim is to propose one such mechanism enabling the collaborative peer to make efficient decisions that guarantees both its satisfaction, defined as the ratio between received and requested resources (which should ideally be one), and fairness, defined as the ratio between the amount of resources obtained and the amount of resources provided (which should ideally be approximately one on the long run). The challenge is to find a scheme that guarantees that the levels of both fairness and satisfaction are good enough to ensure that most participants will not defect and free riders will be isolated or kept with a low degree of satisfaction.
For the reasons explained above, incentives or punishment procedures must exist in order to promote cooperation and keep the federation alive. The scheme we propose in this paper leverages the notion of the Network of Favors (NoF) [1] , an incentive mechanism for resource sharing in P2P opportunistic desktop grids. In NoF, each peer uses only its own locally stored interaction history with other peers, which is basically the balance of favors exchanged (total amount of favors a peer A consumed from peer B minus total amount of favors a peer A
